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Slides:
The Turner ReviewA regulatory response to the global banking crisis [PDF]
Good morning and welcome to the launch of this Review.
Last October the Chancellor of the Exchequer asked me to deliver a Review which would analyse the origins of the financial crisis, assess whether deficiencies in regulation contributed to it, and make recommendations for change. This Review responds to that request. It is accompanied by an FSA Discussion Paper, also published today which goes into more detail on some of the recommendations.
The Review’s focus is on how we create a future banking system which is more stable and better able to serve the needs of businesses and households. It does not address the other pressing priority: how to maintain nominal demand and bank lending to limit the economic downturn. But in Chapter 4 it discusses how the transition to the future system needs to be designed to reflect that concern.
The global financial system has suffered the worst crisis for at least 70 years, indeed the worst global financial crisis since the development of modern capitalism. Proposals for change must be rooted in analysis of what has occurred.
Chapter 1 of the Review presents that analysis in four sections.
The first section describes how the global system of securitised credit intermediation, which had been lauded as a device for diversifying and reducing risks, achieved the precise opposite effect.
Its development was stimulated by large global macro-imbalances, by very low real interest rates, a search for yield uplift, and the perception that the whole world economy had become less risky – the Great Moderation as it was called. It entailed rapid growth of risky lending and an explosion of financial innovation, the alphabet soup of structured credit and credit derivatives. And it was characterized by 7 features which first helped create the boom and are now making its aftermath so economically harmful. Those 7 features – set out on page 28 of the report – are (Exhibit 1):
- Massive growth in the scale and complexity of securitised credit, facilitated by inadequate capital requirements for trading activity.
- Extensive commercial bank involvement in trading activities, which meant that big trading book losses had consequences for confidence in the core banking system.
- Increases in leverage in several different forms, which amplified both the upswing and the downswing we now face.
- New forms of maturity transformation within the banking and shadow banking sectors, with increasing dependence on “liquidity through marketability”.
- A misplaced reliance on sophisticated maths to manage the risks.
- Features such as excessive reliance on ratings – which hard-wired the system to be unstable, both on the way up and the way down.
- And inadequate bank capital buffers, leaving banks with an impaired ability to keep lending to the real economy when the downturn came.
That set of problems helps define what we now have to put right.
The second section describes UK specific aspects of the story. (Exhibit 2) The UK was vulnerable to global problems, because we were home to several of the world’s leading banks, actively involved in risky trading activities. But in addition the UK saw rapid growth of mortgage lending, financed from abroad through the purchase of UK mortgage backed securities and through wholesale bank lending: and we saw the emergence of risky bank business models, overly reliant on wholesale funding – Northern Rock, Bradford and Bingley, HBOS. Those specific UK problems define some other policy priorities, particularly relating to liquidity risk management.
The third section explores faultlines which the crisis revealed in the regulation of cross-border banks. The FSA’s supervisory philosophy, shared with regulators around the world, was that major global banks and investment banks should be allowed to gain the benefits of global scale operation and flexibility. But in Mervyn King’s telling phrase, the collapse of Lehman Brothers showed us that global banks are global in life but national in death – that decisions on fiscal support to prevent failure are national, and that national legal entities and national bankruptcy procedures have major implications for creditors. Those facts have major implications for the future supervision of global banks.
Meanwhile the failure of Landsbanki – "Icesave" – revealed that the present regulatory approach to the European single market in retail banking is unsafe and untenable. Landsbanki had passporting rights to operate as a branch in the UK, primarily supervised by the Icelandic supervisor. Depositor protection rested on the fiscal capacity of Iceland and the resources of its deposit insurance scheme: both were inadequate. Faced with that reality we either need more European coordination or more national powers – more Europe or less Europe – we can’t stay where we are.
The fourth section of Chapter 1 addresses five fundamental theoretical questions (Exhibit 3) and suggest five answers:
- That financial markets are susceptible to irrational herd effects, and more liquid markets are not always better.
- That securitised credit creates inherent risks, but securitisation is here to stay, and can be made safer by appropriate regulation.
- That many important risks cannot be managed by sophisticated maths at the firm level, but have to be constrained by appropriate regulation.
- That market discipline on banks is often ineffective.
- And that much financial innovation has been of minimal social value, representing instead economic rent extraction which has swollen some parts of the financial sector beyond their economically efficient size.
Those answers, as well as the problems identified in the first three sections, need to inform our future regulatory approach.
That future regulatory approach cannot and does not need to be defined with total precision today. As the Governor of the Bank of England pointed out in a speech yesterday evening*, exuberance – rational or irrational – is now so absent that we do not need immediately to have in place our guards against its future re-emergence. And there are many issues where careful thought is required before fixing on the exact design of regulations. But the overall shape of what is required – the principles and objectives – is increasingly clear.
The core recommendations for change are set out in Chapter 2. (Exhibit 4) They are summarized on pages 7-9 of the Review.
The most important are those relating to capital adequacy, published accounts and liquidity. The sections of the review relating to these issues are quite technical – and the accompanying Discussion Paper even more so – I don’t apologize for that – these are issues where the technical details matter. And they are also areas where we need if at all possible to get international agreement. For that reason the precise way forward eventually chosen may be different from the specific details recommended in this Review. But the objectives and principles are clear and set out on Exhibit 2.2 on page 54. (Exhibit 5)
- The banking system of the future should operate with more and higher quality capital, reducing its vulnerability to shocks.
- There should be very major changes to trading book capital, increases of 3 times or so, since this is the key area where the existing regime was seriously deficient, failing to require adequate capital against risky trading activities.
- We need to make the banking system a shock absorber in the economy not a shock amplifier.
- That requires actions to ensure that the introduction of the Basel II capital adequacy regime does not introduce unnecessary procyclicality.
- But we should also go further and introduce a new countercyclical element to the capital regime, with capital buffers built up in good times to be drawn on in economic downturns
- That counter-cyclicality moreover should be reflected in published accounts through an Economic Cycle Reserve which anticipates future potential losses.
- And there should be a backstop maximum gross leverage ratio, limiting the total size of bank balance sheets relative to capital, since when crises arise the bigger the balance sheets the bigger the problems
- Finally, liquidity regulation has to change, fundamentally. In this area, bluntly, regulators across the world took their eyes off the ball, focusing too much on the intricacies of capital regulation.
- So the FSA has already, in December 2008, outlined major changes in its approach, with stress tests defined by regulators as well as by banks themselves and focusing on the whole system as well as on individual institutional risk.
- But we also propose for debate, the introduction of a “core funding ratio” as a tool of both macro and micro risk containment.
These policies will inevitably impose some costs. Bank equity will tend on average to be a slightly lower return investment – though also lower risk.
So there’s a danger that as we tighten regulation on banks, activities might move to non-regulated sectors (Exhibit 4 repeated). That makes it essential that we regulate according to economic substance not legal form, that we do not again allow off balance sheet SIVs to run large risks without adequate controls or investment banks to escape leverage ratio constraints.
If an activity looks like a bank and sounds like a bank, we regulate it like a bank.
And if there are activities, such as hedge funds, which are not at present bank-like or clearly systemically important, but could evolve in that direction in future, we need to gather the information required for regulators and central banks to assess the systemic impact of these institutions, and powers to extend prudential regulation to them if needed.
(Exhibit 4 repeated) A third set of changes relates to credit rating agencies, remuneration, and CDS clearing. We’ve grouped these together because they are all important but it’s also important to realize the limits of what reforms here can achieve.
- Poor credit ratings and poor use of credit ratings played an important role in the crisis. Credit rating techniques were extended from single name corporates, where they had worked well for decades, to complex structured credit products, where they performed badly. And the extensive use of ratings based rules in investment and deposit placing – “I only deposit money with a bank rated AA or above” – introduced significant hard-wired pro-cyclicality into the system. We can and must fix some of these problems. We must regulate Credit Rating Agencies to ensure rigorous analytical independence, and ensure that they only rate instruments simple enough and with enough historic record to make consistent rating possible. And we can address some of the hard-wiring. But the use of ratings based rules will continue, and so therefore will an element of pro-cyclicality which we must offset by other means, such as countercyclical capital and liquidity policies.
- On compensation, we must integrate risk management considerations into remuneration policies. That has not been done before, in the UK or elsewhere in the world, either by individual firms or by regulators. As a result, some bankers have been encouraged by the promise of big bonuses to take excessive risks with other people’s money. The FSA is today publishing a Consultation Paper setting out good principles of risk based remuneration policies, and explaining how we are going to enforce those principles. The Financial Stability Forum will shortly bring forward similar principles for global application. These are important initiatives, but again a word of caution about expecting too much. Our principles suggest that paying people with stock not cash, and with long deferral periods, will tend to discourage excessive risk-taking. But Lehman Brothers was full of employees with long-term stock holdings in the firm. Business leaders believe their own stories: traders are swept up in irrational exuberance. Other policy levers to guard against irrational exuberance are therefore essential.
(Exhibit 4 repeated) That reinforces the need for a regulatory approach focused on the big picture, with analysis of system-wide macro-prudential risks resulting in actions to offset those risks. In the past that macro-prudential focus was missing, in the UK and across the world. In the UK,
- The Bank of England tended to focus on monetary policy defined as using the interest rate lever to hit the inflation target.
- The FSA concentrated too much on the supervision of individual institutions, not sectoral or economy wide trends.
- And the analysis of macro-prudential risks fell into the gap – or what Paul Tucker has labelled the “underlap” – between us.
In future, both the Bank of England and the FSA must be intensively and collaboratively involved in analyzing macro-prudential developments and deciding between them the measures – such as the use of countercyclical capital or liquidity levers – which if necessary will take away the punch bowl before the party gets out of hand.
And at the global level, we need to ensure that institutions like the IMF have the robust independence to do excellent macro-prudential analysis, to criticise if necessary the policies of major economic powers, and to challenge conventional wisdom.
Implementing these changes will require a very major shift in the FSA’s approach to regulation and supervision.
The essence of that shift is summed up on this slide. (Exhibit 6)
- Until the crisis struck, the FSA’s approach was based on an overt philosophy that markets are in general self correcting, that market discipline is effective, and that management and boards are better placed than any regulator to identify business system risks, provided processes, structures, and systems are appropriately defined.
- Therefore we focused on processes, structures and systems. We focused on individual institutions not sector wide or system-wide risks. And we focused on the probity of approved persons not their technical competence.
- And we tended to focus on conduct of business issues, and not enough on core prudential risks.
We are now 2/3 way through a programme which is changing that, not marginally but radically, moving to a philosophy of "intense supervision" which will entail:
- Much larger resources devoted to the supervision of high impact firms.
- A much more intense focus on business strategies and system-wide risks.
- More focus on technical competence not just probity.
- More focus on the details of bank accounting.
- And much greater willingness to reach judgments about the overall risks that firms are running.
The details of that major shift are set out in Section 7 of Chapter 2.
Section 8 then (Exhibit 4 repeated) sets out some implications which may follow for risk governance within firms, for the role and time commitment of non-executive directors and the reporting relationships between risk managers and risk committees.
The final two sections of Chapter 2 address the specific challenges involved in regulating and supervising large complex firms which span a wide range of different activities, and banks which span borders.
On the first of these – large complex firms – a debate has developed as to whether regulation should force a complete separation of “narrow banking” from “investment banking” or, as some express it, “utility banking” from “casino banking”. Section 9 considers that proposition. It expresses support for the objective – that we have to prevent the benefits of retail deposit insurance, lender of last resort access and too big to fail status being used to support adventures in risky propriety trading activities of little social value. But it also expresses scepticism about whether a complete separation is possible. (Exhibit 7)
- It is certainly not possible to separate casino banking so completely that we can happily let it go bankrupt in crisis; Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers were not deposit takers, they were separate from narrow banks, but they were still systemically important. And narrowness is no defence against excess; diversification has its virtues: Northern Rock, Washington Mutual and Indy Mac – three big bank failures of the crisis – were all narrow banks.
- And in a world of global corporations, floating exchange rates, global capital flows, there is an important role for complex global banks involved in a wide range of activities, some of which do require market making activities and some position taking. And an important role also for a new less risky form of securitised credit intermediation.
So Section 9 does not suggest complete separation. But it does argue that better controls on capital and liquidity, and much tighter supervision, will and should result in many commercial banks choosing to play much reduced roles in propriety trading activity, and that global commercial banks which are involved in market making and trading activities, will and should be doing so in order to support their services to corporate customers, rather than as free standing propriety activities.
(Exhibit 4 repeat) Section 10 of Chapter 2 addresses the faultlines in the regulation of cross-border banks revealed by the Lehman Brothers and Landsbanki failures.
The challenge with global banks is that we have a global financial system but no global government, and that dichotomy is not going to disappear. The appropriate response combines as much global coordination and cooperation as possible, with an increased focus also on the sustainability of local legal entities.
- The FSA has therefore played a major role in the development of international colleges of supervisors for the thirty largest complex and cross-border financial institutions.
- We are also strong supporters of an initiative by the Financial Stability Forum to ensure that we have contingency plans in place for globally coordinated crisis response.
- But we also believe, and have reflected in our Consultation Paper on liquidity, that host country supervisors have to be more willing to impose local liquidity ring-fencing, and if necessary, to require strongly capitalised local subsidiaries.
Turning from the global to the European perspective, here we do have a treaty based and law making institution, the European Union, and the rights of banks to operate as branches across borders are written into European law. But this system of passporting rights is unsafe and untenable.
The issue is whether the response should be more European coordination or more national powers. We propose both. (Exhibit 8)
- We recommend the creation of a new European institution into which the existing Lamfalussy Committees will fold, with legal powers in the area of regulation, and acting as a standard setter and coordinator in the area of supervision.
- But also an increase in national powers to restrict the aggressive growth of retail deposit taking branches.
- And we pose for debate whether some European dimension of deposit insurance is required to manage risks to depositors when large banks from small countries are active as branches in other countries.
(Exhibit 4 repeat) So those are the clear recommendations which are also discussed in the Discussion Paper.
But the analysis of the causes of the crisis, and the fundamental theoretical issues, also suggest some wider issues and open questions, which are posed for debate in Chapter 3. These include: (Exhibit 9)
- Whether the FSA should be involved in mortgage market regulation for either customer protection or prudential reasons, with important arguments for and against, which require careful assessment.
- Whether some wholesale financial products should be subject to regulation.
- Whether we need other countercyclical tools apart from capital and liquidity levers.
- How to balance the benefits of liquidity with the dangers of instability, for instance in decisions about short-selling.
Finally, Chapter 4 sets out next steps – how to get implementation. In some cases the FSA can act alone. In others, we are acting through international fora – the FSF or the Basel Committee – to gain global agreements, and that implies that the details which emerge may differ somewhat from the precise options we have put forward.
But there is already much global agreement on the principles and objectives; on the steps we need to take to create a more stable banking system for the future, better able to serve the needs of businesses and households, better able to be a shock-absorber in the economy, rather than a source of instability.
* Mervyn King, Finance: A Return for Risk, Working Compass of International Banks, Tuesday 17th March 2009