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FESE believes that a number of aspects of the Level 3 are not functioning effectively because of the lack of a clear designation of the competent authority. We believe that implementing a clear competent authority regime would diminish uncertainties with regard to which jurisdiction is relevant – especially in the case of a multi-listed companies environment – for numerous situations including:
- Which competent authority should be responsible for specifying the mechanisms to disclose inside information;
- Which competent authority should be informed by the issuer about the decision to delay inside information;
- Which competent authority should recognise the insider lists prepared by an issuer that has its registered office in another Member State.
Although we recognise that this lack of clarity comes from Level 1 and Level 2, we ask for CESR’s support to address this subject to the relevant authority. We nonetheless remain convinced that CESR’s Level 3 guidance is beneficial and helpful to the industry.
Separate from the competent authority regime subject is the lack of consistency in the implementation of a number of areas of the market abuse regime where CESR could provide guidance and clarifications like when to disclose inside information (e.g. how an issuer should behave during the period of time elapsing from the moment in which inside information arises and the moment in which it is disclosed or situations in which inside information arises during nonbusiness days), when client orders constitute inside information (the concepts of “client’s pending order” and “front running”) and insider lists in multiple jurisdictions (e.g. whether the issuer should inform the supervisor of updates to the list of insiders on an ongoing basis or upon the request of the supervisor
