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The Rubble And The Rebuild: The Future Of Financial Regulation Series At The Brookings Institute, SEC Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Washington D.C., Dec. 11, 2025

Date 11/12/2025

Good morning and thank you Aaron [Klein].  It is a pleasure to be here this morning.  While this isn’t a “farewell address,” I hope you will indulge me if I take the opportunity to reflect a little bit on what I’ve learned, what we accomplished prior to this year, and provide commentary on where I think the markets are today and where I think they should be headed.[1]

***

The securities laws, as drafted, were designed to provide legal structure around an intricate system of market participants with different interests and different incentives.  It has evolved over time, including through the passage of new statutes and rules, into a unique ecosystem of checks and balances.[2]

This structure, which has accommodated growth in volume, speed, and complexity over the last 90 years, is far from perfect.[3]  But, more or less, it has worked.  If those who can afford to invest buy and hold plain vanilla diversified products based on investment advice that is provided in their best interest, those investors should get, and generally have gotten, more money out than they put in. And American businesses have successfully raised capital year-in and year-out.

Our job, at the SEC, is to ensure fairness and order, improve efficiency and effectiveness, and require appropriate transparency in the markets.  We must do that carefully and with adherence to certain foundational principles, including, ideally, the belief that this is a system for everyone, and not for any special interest or market participant.  The job of the SEC is a critical one.  The agency must understand the interactions between all of the participants, while recognizing the interests and incentives of each of them, and ensure that the overall structure remains balanced and works for everyone.

Nearly five and half years ago, I had the privilege of testifying before the Senate for a hearing on my nomination.  At that hearing, I explained who I wanted to be as a Commissioner.  I said:

"I [] carry with me [today] the Stories of Soldiers, family, and friends who give the SEC’s mission real meaning.  As a Captain in the United State Army Reserve, Judge Advocate General Corps, that mission means making sure my fellow Soldiers have a fighting chance to secure the financial futures they deserve.  As a sister of an entrepreneur, it means making sure our markets unite job-creating capital with individuals like my brother who recently started a small business developing 3D printing technology for military uses.  [A]s a new mother, it means promoting the level playing field that will allow my family and millions of other American families, to fund the rising costs of education by safely and confidently investing in our markets.  [As a Commissioner, I promise to] provide tools that allow individuals…to fund their retirements in safe and sustainable ways."

Those were some lofty goals!  Whether I have been successful in pursuit of those goals, history will judge.  But I can say proudly, today, that I never lost sight of why I took this job.

Over my tenure, the Commission has brought meaningful enforcement actions to recompense victims of fraud and wrongdoing, including soldiers and their families;[4] simplified disclosures;[5] made it harder for corporate insiders to rig the system to their benefit;[6] required disclosure of material information on executive compensation,[7] climate risk,[8] and cybersecurity risk;[9] and put in place restrictions designed to enhance the protection of customer information.[10]

Unfortunately, recently, my voice has become one of ubiquitous dissent.  It has been unsettling to see how precipitously one Commission is willing to undo the work of the Commission that came before it—all without a single notice-and-comment rulemaking to date.  I’m concerned that the fundamental precepts upon which our markets have been built—tenets that have, by and large, kept our markets safe for both issuers and investors alike—are being eroded.  I fear that the very core of our intricate market structure is under attack.  And instead of safeguarding our markets for investors to fund their retirements in safe and sustainable ways, we are moving in a direction where markets start to look like casinos.  The problem with casinos, of course, is that in the long run the house always wins.  This approach flies in the face of the work I set out to do.  Here’s how.

I.

The Rubble

Trend 1: Devaluing the Investor

First and foremost, we see a trend towards devaluing investor rights.  It’s pervasive and already worn deep.

For example, the Commission has made it harder for investors to communicate their preferences to issuer management;[11] it has shown outright hostility to investor proxy proposals;[12] and, we are dismantling private rights of action by allowing public issuers to force their shareholders into arbitration.[13]

These actions seem fueled by the fictitious notion that we need to punish investors in order to revitalize public markets – or purportedly to “make IPOs great again.”  But IPOs can only be revitalized with investor money.  Treating investors as a nuisance is shortsighted at best.

Trend 2: Moving Into the Shadows

While part and parcel of the devaluation of investors, a separate and pervasive trend of this Commission is moving markets out of the light and into darkness.  Intent on reducing industry’s perceived burdens, this Commission is reducing transparency.  For example, it has stated plans to reduce the cadence of public-issuer filings.[14]  This means investors will have less access to timely financial information, including audited financial statements, less analysis from management, fewer disclosures about evolving risks, less analyst coverage, and it will be easier to smooth earnings shortfalls, among many other potential effects.  Investment decisions will inevitably be based on either: (i) stale data, (ii) data voluntarily released by companies that lack uniformity (at best) or are cherry-picked (at worst); or (iii) on information other than company metrics, such as social media posts, promotions, hype, or even just “vibes.”  The Commission has also made clear that it intends to roll back the universe of people who must register and what information must be disclosed.[15]

Transparency is also important for ensuring our equity markets work fairly and efficiently. One of the great strengths of U.S. equity markets is the use of displayed bid and offer prices by exchanges, which we call “lit trading.”  Lit trading matters because it provides an important and central public source of price transparency that can directly benefit investors.  Displayed quotes are used for many purposes such as informing trading decisions, establishing security valuations, and performing index calculations.  In addition, exchange trading is important for maintaining high investor protection standards since exchanges are subject to comprehensive regulation.

However, in recent years, there has been a shift in market activity away from “lit trading” on exchanges to dark markets.  There is increasing evidence that this shift is “obscuring the true prices of stocks, raising the cost of trading, and, by extension, damaging investor confidence.”[16]  For this reason, it is fundamentally important to support displayed liquidity and carefully consider any interventions that might impact transparency in our equity market structure—such as limiting or rescinding the Order Protection Rule, which the Commission seems poised to do.[17]

The Commission has also been shrouding its policymaking in darkness, shunning public comments and, instead, relying on hidden voices to drive its agenda.  In a mad dash to implement its policy preferences, the Commission, again and again, has implemented a new vision through staff statements[18] and extensions of the compliance dates of Commission rules[19] without deigning to ask investors what they think and what they want. This approach flouts notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act.[20]  Moreover, it is a different approach than my colleagues advocated for when policies they did not favor were on the table.[21]

What is lost when the Commission does not solicit public comment?  Well, obviously, the Commission loses out on the benefit of the public flagging blind spots the Commission did not see.  The public also loses the opportunity to identify the industry voices driving the policy decisions and to evaluate their motives.  The public deserves to know who is really behind the policy choices that will impact their financial futures.  Perhaps most perniciously, this retreat from public comment denigrates investors, sending the clear message that the Commission does not value their perspectives and that it knows better than investors do what is best for them.  The Commission’s approach to nontransparent policymaking has treated investors like silly children to be ignored rather than fully formed persons with ideas and concerns worth hearing and considering. Investors deserve better.

Trend 3:  Pushing Main Street Investors into Private Markets Without Protections.

This brings me to another trend.  The Commission is opening the private markets to Main Street investors’ pockets, including their retirement assets.[22]  This is a harmful policy choice—and not just because it undermines the safer, more transparent, and more efficient public markets.  The private markets expose retail investors to more risky investments—ones that were specifically crafted for non-retail investors.  To justify this irresponsible departure from foundational pillars of the securities laws, my colleagues use lots of buzz words—freedom, diversification,[23] democratization.[24]  Call it what you will, at bottom it’s risky and it’s reckless. 

Private markets do not offer the same guardrails that make our public markets a level playing field for retail investors.[25]  There’s limited transparency.  Investors don’t get the same standardized disclosures as in the public markets; the Commission does not have the same tools to detect fraud or other wrongdoing before it happens; investors are kept in the dark about certain fees and expenses; and valuations are opaque and inconsistent.[26]  In the private markets, smaller investors almost certainly will be subject to higher fees (and, therefore, lower returns) than large investors with the power to negotiate. 

Unleashing the private markets’ insatiable hunger for capital on retail investors’ wallets will come back to bite regulators—but not before Main Street Americans’ savings have been looted.

Trend 4: Deterrence? What is That?

As the Commission dismisses investors, reduces transparency, and sends retail into the private markets wilderness, it cedes important tools: Its enforcement tools.  We see this in multiple ways: 

  • The Commission has dismissed SEC enforcement actions left and right, undermining the credibility of our lawyers and the agency overall;[27]
  • It has brought fewer enforcement actions;[28]
  • Civil penalties, when assessed, are purposefully lower;[29]
  • The purveyors of massive white-collar fraud are being pardoned or having their sentences commuted by the President,[30] leading the Commission in many cases to drop its parallel litigations as an “exercise of its discretion”;[31]
  • Whistleblower awards have all but grounded to a halt;[32]
  • As I mentioned earlier, the Commission has given permission to issuers to enforce mandatory arbitration provisions against their shareholders, meaning (i) less private enforcement of the law, and (ii) confidentiality provisions that will keep corporate wrongdoing out of the public eye.[33]  

Deterring misconduct is a public good.  Without deterrence, there is no accountability. Corporate actors comply with the rules because failing to do so, under normal circumstances, is costly.  When we remove the tools that detect fraud and we make it less costly to commit fraud, people will commit more fraud.  It’s that simple.

***

Taken together, these trends embody a sort of chaos that I think has characterized the past year.  The appetite to deregulate has been rapacious; the analysis of the costs and benefits of our policies has been non-existent; and, the repercussions, I would argue, could be dire.  We live in an echo chamber where politicians and policymakers make their own truth through repetition.[34]  But, the markets have a way of correcting themselves—not always immediately, but over time.  So, I think the true advisability of these policies will reveal themselves eventually. I certainly wouldn’t be alone in analogizing the trend toward deregulation in the current environment to the period prior to the stock market crash in 1929.[35]

And our ability to understand and respond to market events of all kinds is only as good as our best resource: the staff.  Staff numbers across the board are down by between 15-20 percent.  I cannot overemphasize how harmful the overnight loss of decades of institutional knowledge and securities expertise has been to our agency generally, and how significantly it will impair our ability to respond nimbly in times of tumult.  We have lost experts of all stripes who have weathered past market events; brought reform from calamity; guided recovery efforts; and have instituted protections that decrease the risk that similar disasters might happen again.

Of late, we have frequently been told that today is a “new day” at the Commission.  But anyone aware of our place in the calendar knows that with each successive day the nights grow longer.  I fear that the darkest depths of winter still lie ahead for America’s capital markets.

II.

The Rebuild

That’s the doom and gloom part of the speech.  But out of the rubble I believe we can find opportunity.  Clarity. Purpose.  I believe we will have the chance to rebuild and we will rebuild it better than before.  And, of course, I’m here at Brookings, so I need to bring some big ideas.  I challenge each of you to envision, debate, and, importantly, build consensus around those ideas so the best of them can be implemented when the time comes.

I think the big question we will likely have to answer is: how do we make our markets work for the American people?  The government is responding to big industry’s wish list at the moment,[36] but our focus should be on everyday Americans.

First, let’s return to market fundamentals.  We need to promote policies that encourage trading based on actual fundamentals: issuer operations, cash flows and real financial metrics of companies, not on tweets.  Policies should favor long-term buy-and-hold investing.  People invest in crypto because they see (some) others get rich overnight.  Less visible are the more common stories of people losing their shirts.

One thing that has consistently puzzled me about crypto is – what are cryptocurrency prices based on?  Many (but not all) crypto purchasers are not trading based on economic fundamentals.  I think it’s safe to say they’re speculating, reacting to hysteria from promoters, feeding a desire to gamble, wash trading to push up prices, or as one Nobel laureate has posited – betting on the popularity of the politicians who support, or stand to benefit personally from, the success of crypto.[37]  Regardless of asset class, our legal framework – including our tax framework (I’m looking at you, Congress) – must promote long-term investing based on sound economic principles.

Second, government should be more nimble and interdisciplinary.  The world looks very different than it did when our financial agencies were created.  We may have to reimagine financial regulatory agency structure or at least come up with a framework for real collaboration that looks different than today.  Does it make sense that some lending is overseen by banking regulators and some lending is overseen by the SEC?  And all the while neither regulator has real insight into how exposed our banks are to private credit?[38]  Does it make sense that commodity-based swaps are regulated by the CFTC and security-based swaps to be regulated by the SEC?  Do these products look sufficiently different to require different regulatory regimes?

And, Congress may have to ask normative questions about the way the economy is structured.  Private equity is buying up single family homes, healthcare, and even the very accounting firms that may be signing off on the financial health of their portfolio companies.  We need to look carefully at whether more robust guardrails are needed around these practices. 

Third, we must confront the changing face of the American economy. Artificial Intelligence is here.  It might well upend the labor force.[39]  We need to revisit our rulebook with AI in mind.  For example, many of our securities laws require evidence of bad intent to prove a violation.  But how will we prove intent if no human is involved?  And, what are the real risks involving the use of AI by issuers and intermediaries that investors should know about?  Is shifting compliance obligations to AI tools resulting in appropriate internal reviews?  We will need to build a more rigorous scaffolding around the markets to address AI.

Fourth, let’s pursue policies that actually promote our small businesses.  We should be a resource to them as they seek to raise capital, by helping them understand our disclosure regimes and helping them get information to investors about their businesses.  And let us reimagine our exemptions from public company registration, including Regulation D, which has effectively become an economic subsidy for large private issuers, to the disadvantage of our small businesses.  We should revisit this. Let’s take a look at what small really means, not just reflexively provide loopholes and exemptions and rollbacks for larger and larger businesses.

And finally, let us govern with ethics and meaning.  Let us respect and support our public servants, not punish them.  Let us give regulators the tools they need to oversee markets in a meaningful way and to help prevent the all-to-predictable mistakes of the past from repeating themselves.

Let us rebuild with the purpose of ensuring that the American economy works for everybody, not just those able to buy political influence—so my fellow Soldiers have a fighting chance to secure the financial futures they deserve; so our markets unite job-creating capital with small business owners like my brother; so families can fund the rising costs of education; and, so Americans can fund their retirements in safe and sustainable ways.

Thank you.


[1] As of course I must say, the views I express today are my own and do not necessarily represent the views of the SEC and of my fellow Commissioners.

[2] The ecosystem is complex. Colloquially, it involves issuers, brokers, dealers, exchanges, transfer agents, clearing houses, self-regulatory organizations, auditing firms, organizations which set accounting rules, and organizations which oversee the auditing firms, fund complexes, investment advisers, credit rating agencies, index providers, and third party service providers, to name only a few.  And, of course, there are investors and the SEC, the agency that sets the rules and standards for this ecosystem, within the auspices of the powers granted by Congress.

[3] Perhaps this system could benefit from some rethinking in terms of how markets, technology, and business models have evolved.  But it is the system we have, and it is designed to protect investors, promote transparency,  maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.

[4] See, e.g., SEC v. Caz L. Craffy, No., 23-cv-3639 (D.N.J. Complaint filed on July 7, 2023); SEC v. Robert L. Murray, Jr., 22-cv-01329 (N.D. Ohio Complaint filed on July 27, 2022); SEC v. Marco “Sully” Perezet al., 21-cv-00238 (W.D. Tex. Complaint filed Dec. 14, 2021).

[5] Securities & Exchange Commission, Final Rule, Tailored Shareholder Reports for Mutual Funds and Exchange Traded Funds; Fee Information for Investment Company Advertisements, Release Nos. 33-11125, 34-96158, IC-34731 (Oct. 26, 2022).

[6] Securities & Exchange Commission, Final Rule, Insider Trading Arrangements and Related Disclosures, Release Nos. 33-11138, 34-96492 (Dec. 14, 2022).

[7] Securities & Exchange Commission, Final Rule, Pay Versus Performance, Release No. 34-95607 (Aug. 25, 2022).

[8] See Securities & Exchange Commission, The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors, Release Nos. 33-11275, 34-99678 (Mar. 6, 2024).

[9] Securities & Exchange Commission, Final Rule, Cybersecurity Risk Management, Strategy, Governance, and Incident Disclosure Release Nos. 33-11216, 34-97989 (July 26, 2023).

[10] Securities & Exchange Commission, Final Rule, Regulation S-P: Privacy of Consumer Financial Information and Safeguarding Customer Information, Release Nos. 34-100155, IA-6604, IC-35193 (May 16, 2024).

[11] See Securities & Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, Exchange Act Section 13(d) and 13(g) and Regulation 13D-G Beneficial Ownership Reporting, Questions 103.11 and 103.12 (Feb. 11, 2025) (lowering standards for investor communications to indicate an effort to control the issuer, and therefore disqualify the investor from seeking 13G filer status). 

[12] See Securities & Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, Shareholder Proposals: Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14M (Feb. 12, 2025); Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement on Staff Legal Bulletin 14M (Feb. 12, 2025); Securities & Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, Statement Regarding the Division of Corporation Finance's Role in the Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 Process for the Current Proxy Season (Nov. 17, 2025); Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement on Division of Corporation Finance’s Announcement on the 14a-8 Process (Nov. 17, 2025); see also Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Keynote Address at the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance’s 25th Anniversary Gala (Oct. 9, 2025).  But see Jill Fisch, Sarah Haan, Ann M. Lipton, and Amelia Miazad, Stockholder Proposals—Law and Policy Considerations, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Dec. 9, 2025) (expressing skepticism about the proposition that precatory proposals may be improper under Delaware law).  

[13] Securities & Exchange Commission, Acceleration of Effectiveness of Registration Statements of Issuers with Certain Mandatory Arbitration Provisions; Release Nos. 33-11389, 34-103988 (Sept. 19, 2025); see also Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Mandatory Dis-Agreements: The Commission’s Policy of Quietly Shutting the Door on Investors (Sept. 17, 2025).

[14] See, e.g., Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Squawk Box (Sept. 19, 2025).

[15] See Securities & Exchange Commission, Agency Rule List – Spring 2025 (Sept. 4, 2025); Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Remarks at the Executive Compensation Roundtable (June 26, 2025).

[16] Editorial Board, Trading in the Dark, NY Times (Apr. 6, 2013).

[17] See Securities & Exchange Commission, Roundtable on Trade-Through Prohibitions Agenda, Panel Three (Sept. 18, 2025).

[18] See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, Statement Regarding the Division of Corporation Finance's Role in the Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 Process for the Current Proxy Season (Nov. 17, 2025) (determining that the Division will “not respond to no-action requests for, and express no views on, companies’ intended reliance on any basis for exclusion of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8, other than no-action requests to exclude a [precatory] proposal”); see also Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement on Division of Corporation Finance’s Announcement on the 14a-8 Process (Nov. 17, 2025).

[19] See Securities & Exchange Commission, Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers; Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-6838 (Jan. 29, 2025) (three-month extension of compliance dates for the amendments to Form PF); Securities & Exchange Commission, Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers; Further Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-6883 (June 11, 2025) (three-and-a-half-month extension of compliance dates for the amendments to Form PF); Securities & Exchange Commission, Form PF; Reporting Requirements for All Filers and Large Hedge Fund Advisers; Further Extension of Compliance Date, Release No. IA-6919 (Sept. 17, 2025) (one-year extension of compliance dates for the amendments to Form PF); Securities & Exchange Commission, Order Granting Temporary Exemptive Relief, Pursuant to Sections 13(f)(3) and 36(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Compliance with Rule 13f-2 and Form SHO, and Pursuant to Section 36(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 from Certain Aspects of Rule 10c-1a, Release No. 34-104303 (Dec. 3, 2025) (two-year extension of Exchange Act Rule 10c-1a (Securities Lending Reporting) and Exchange Act Rule 13f-2 (Short Position and Short Activity Reporting)); see also Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Extensions on Extensions: Statement on Further Extension of the Form PF Compliance Date (June 11, 2025); Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Repeal By Extension: Statement on Yet Another Extension of the Form PF Compliance Date (Sept. 17, 2025); Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement on Extension of Compliance Dates for Securities Lending Reporting and Short Position and Short Activity Reporting (Dec. 3, 2025).

[20] One issue with crafting policy changes through non-rulemaking avenues is that the agency does not conduct a cost-benefit analysis to adequately consider the impact of its actions.  Then, if the agency does subsequently engage in rulemaking, the Commission can play games with the economic baseline, to make it seem as if policy changes are less costly than they really are.

[21] See Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Statement on Reporting of Securities Loans (Oct. 13, 2023) (expressing “significant concerns with the rulemaking process” when the public was given only 30 days to comment); Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Statement on Reopening of Comment Period for Share Repurchase Disclosure Modernization (Dec. 7, 2022) (“One might ask: what is the purpose of the comment period? Is it merely an item to be checked off to satisfy the lowest acceptable standard of process required by the Administrative Procedures [sic] Act? Or is it a vital component of a discussion between an administrative agency and the public in order to better understand the effects of a proposed rule, especially under a changed factual scenario? I believe it is the latter.” (footnote omitted)); Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Statement on the Final Rule Related to Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation (Oct. 26, 2002) (arguing that 30-day comment periods “significantly weaken a cornerstone of effective rulemaking: feedback from investors, issuers, and intermediaries to provide us with their expertise”); Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Remarks at the APABA-DC Awards and Installation Reception (Oct. 19, 2022) (“The quality of agency rulemaking suffers when the public is unable to meaningfully participate. These procedural failures also can expose Commission rulemaking to challenge in the courts.”); id. (arguing that the legitimacy of agency action needs to be restored and that “[t]he blueprint for restoring that legitimacy is straightforward: ensure that every regulatory action goes well above and beyond the bare minimum required by law”); Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Statement on Final Rule Amendments on Proxy Voting Advice (July 13, 2022) (arguing that a 30-day comment period spanning “major holidays, including Thanksgiving, Christmas, Hanukkah, and the beginning of Kwanzaa” was insufficient and noting that short comment period might have “resulted in the Commission only seeing a narrower picture of the public concerns and failing to capture relevant data and perspectives”); see also Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Rendering Innovation Kaput: Statement on Amending the Definition of Exchange (Apr. 14, 2023) (“Today’s Commission treats the notice-and-comment rulemaking process not as a conversation, but as a threat.”); Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Exclusion Preclusion: Statement on the Shareholder Proposals Proposal (July 13, 2022) (“The likelihood of receiving thoughtful comments in response to these questions and the many others in the proposal is diminished by the Commission’s continued unwillingness to afford adequate time for public comment.”); Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Rip Current Rulemakings: Statement on the Regulatory Flexibility Agenda (June 22, 2022) (advocating for longer comment periods and contending, “We have abandoned our careful and considered approach to altering regulation in favor of effecting hasty and sweeping change”); Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Dissenting Statement on the Proposal to Amend Regulation ATS (Jan. 26, 2022) (“I cannot comprehend why we insist on blindfolding ourselves, rather than embracing the notice-and-comment process that has been so valuable in unearthing issues for our consideration. . . . We face no emergency in these markets that compels us to limit comments to 30 days; indeed, the Commission’s precipitous rush to plow through the comment period—almost as if it were a mere formality in our process—presents a greater immediate risk to the market than any of the issues that have led to this recommendation.”).

[22] See Democratizing Access to Alternative Assets for 401(K) Investors, Executive Order No. 14330, 90 FR 38921 (Aug. 7, 2025).

[23] Some have argued that we must open up private markets to diversify retail portfolios.  But, (i) there is ample diversification available in the public markets, and (ii) you only need to provide access to private markets for diversification if we continue to pursue policies that grow the private markets at the expense of the public markets.

[24]See, e.g., Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Remarks at the Investor Advisory Committee Meeting (Sept. 18, 2025) (“To its core, I believe that this conversation is about freedom and fairness. It is about the idea that exposure to the full dynamism of our markets should not be reserved for the wealthiest or for those deemed to be the most sophisticated.”); Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, SIFMA’s Private Markets Valuation Roundtable (Sept. 4, 2025) (“When managed responsibly, these investments can offer meaningful diversification and long-term growth potential.”); Commissioner Hester M. Peirce, Let Them Ride: Remarks at the Meeting of the SEC Investor Advisory Committee (Sept. 18, 2025) (“[Investors] want to have the freedom to invest in the assets and markets they choose, and they resent the fact that private markets are the exclusive reserve of the wealthy.”).

[26] See, e.g., Natasha Sarin, How Bad Is Finance’s Cockroach Problem? We Are About to Find Out, NY Times (Oct. 27, 2025).

[27] Seee.g., Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, ‘Tis the Season for Dismissals: Statement on Ending “Dealer” Lawsuits (May 22, 2025); see also Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, A Reckless Game of Regulatory Jenga - Remarks at “SEC Speaks” at n.14 (May 19, 2025) (collecting cases); SEC v. Archer, No. 16-cv-3505 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 11, 2016) (Joint Stipulation to Dismiss and Releases, ECF No. 306); SEC v. Ozy Media, Inc., No. 23-cv-1424 (E.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 23, 2023) (Stipulation of Dismissal and Releases, ECF No. 44); SEC v. Milton, No. 21-cv-6445 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 29, 2021) (Joint Stipulation to Dismiss and Releases, ECF No. 54); see generally Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement on the Agency’s Settlement with Ripple Labs, Inc. (May 8, 2025) (“The [proposed Ripple] settlement [which undermines the SEC and its enforcement program.  It subverts the clear and honest application of the facts to the law, a cornerstone of any effective law enforcement program.  [T]he settlement joins a line of dismissals that collectively erode the credibility of our lawyers in court who are being asked to take legal positions today contrary to the ones taken just months ago.  And it stands in defiant contravention of the doctrine of regularity of government affairs.”).

[28] See, e.g., Cornerstone Research, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Public Companies and Subsidiaries Drop by 30% in FY 2025 (noting, for example, that 93% of FY 2025 actions were filed before the administration change); Brattle, SEC Enforcement Activity for Fiscal Year 2025:  A Tale of Two Halves (Oct. 28, 2025) (noting an “unprecedented slowdown in SEC Enforcement” in the second half of FY 2025).

[29] Civil penalties are now guided by the fiction of the “corporate benefit.”  See generally Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006).  But see Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Moving Forward Together – Enforcement for Everyone (Mar. 9, 2021). 

[30] Those with this notorious distinction include: David Gentilesee United States v. Gentile, 21-cr-00054 (E.D.N.Y.); Joseph Lewissee United States v. Lewis, No. 23-cr-370 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2024) (Judgment, ECF No. 69) (sentenced to 3 years probation, a $5 million fine, and $400,000 in restitution for conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud); Changpeng Zhaosee United States v. Zhao, No. 23-cr-179 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 30, 2024) (Judgment, ECF No. 90) (sentenced to 4 months imprisonment and a $50 million fine for failure to maintain an effective anti-money laundering program); Charles Overton Scottsee United States v. Scott, No. 21-cr-491 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2025) (Judgment, ECF No. 541) (sentenced to 42 months imprisonment, $500,000 fine, and $50,000 in restitution for securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud); Carlos Roy Watsonsee United States v. Watson, No. 23-cr-82 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2025) (Amended Judgment, ECF No.389) (sentenced to 116 months imprisonment, two years supervised release, and $36.7 million in restitution for conspiracy to commit securities fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft); Jason Galanissee United States v. Galanis, No. 16-cr-371 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017) (Judgment, ECF No.233) & United States v. Galanis, No. 15-cr-643 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2017) (Amended Judgment, ECF No.420) (sentenced to a combined 195 consecutive months imprisonment, 3 years supervised release, and over $84 million in restitution for conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit investment adviser fraud); Trevor Miltonsee United States v. Milton, No.21-cr-478 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2024) (Judgment, ECF No. 327) (sentenced to 48 months imprisonment and 3 years supervised release for securities fraud and wire fraud); Devon Archersee United States v. Archer, No. 16-cr-371 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (Judgment, ECF No. 1007) (sentenced to one year and one day imprisonment, one year supervised release, ad $43.4 million in restitution for conspiracy to commit securities fraud and securities fraud).

[31] The SEC dismissals were by not legally required.

[32] See, e.g., John Holland, Whistleblower Awards Slow to Trickle as SEC Raises Bar on Claims, Bloomberg (Jul. 22, 2025); see generally Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement of Commissioner on Whistleblower Program Rule Amendments (Sept. 23, 2020).

[33] Securities & Exchange Commission, Acceleration of Effectiveness of Registration Statements of Issuers with Certain Mandatory Arbitration Provisions; Release Nos. 33-11389, 34-103988 (Sept. 19, 2025); Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, Mandatory Dis-Agreements: The Commission’s Policy of Quietly Shutting the Door on Investors (Sept. 17, 2025).

[34] See, e.g., Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Remarks of Chairman Paul S. Atkins (Apr. 22, 2025) (“It IS a new day.”); Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Remarks at the Meeting of the Investor Advisory Committee (June 5, 2025) (“As I have said before, it is a new day at the SEC . . . .”); Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Statement on the Spring 2025 Regulatory Agenda (Sept. 4, 2025) (“This regulatory agenda reflects that it is a new day at the Securities and Exchange Commission.”); Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Consolidated Audit Trail: A New Day for the CAT (Sept. 30, 2025); Chairman Paul S. Atkins, Revitalizing America’s Markets at 250 (Dec. 2, 2025) (noting a “new day at the SEC”).

[35] See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Trump is Pushing Us Toward a Crash.  It could be 1929 All Over Again, NY Times (Nov. 7, 2025); Andrew Ross Sorkin, 1929: Inside the Greatest Crash in Wall Street History—and How it Shattered a Nation, Penguin Random House (2025). 

[36] Paul Krugman, Predatory Financialization. Understanding Income Inequality, Part V, Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality (Aug. 4, 2025).

[37] Paul Krugman, How Crypto Became a Trump Trade, Substack (Oct. 14, 2025) (discussing, for example, why the price of crypto dropped around President Trump’s seemingly unrelated posts about China); see also David Krause, Cryptocurrency Markets Reveal the Price of Political Patronage, Columbia Law School Bluesky Blog (Dec. 5, 2025); Paul Krugman, Crypto. Understanding Inequality: Part VII, Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality (Aug. 18, 2025).

[38] See, e.g., Editorial Board, Bloomberg Opinion, Private Credit Woes Should Put Banks on Notice (Dec. 5, 2025) (“How worried should the US be about private credit?  Already this year, more than 1 in 10 private credit borrowers are deferring cash interest payments and at least 45 firms have been taken over by their lenders, the most in six years.  Pools of private credit loans managed by BlackRock Inc. and Blue Owl Capital Inc. are showing signs of distress.  The essential question is whether banks are sufficiently insulated from these risks.”); see generally Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, In-securities: What Happens When Investors in an Important Market are not Protected? (Oct. 11, 2023); Lee Harris and Euan Healy, Private Credit Loan Ratings May be Systematically Inflated, Warns BIS, Financial Times (Oct. 27, 2025).

[39] Neil Callanan, Howard Marks Says AI Terrifying for Jobs, Queries Debt Cost, Bloomberg (Dec. 9, 2025).