Statement On Proposed Rescission Of Rule 206(4)-5 Under The Investment Advisers Act, SEC Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda, Sept. 3, 2026

Sixteen years ago, the Commission adopted Rule 206(4)-5 under the Investment Advisers Act (“Advisers Act”).[1] Its adoption was hailed as “significantly curtail[ing] the corrupting influence of ‘pay to play.’”[2] The selection of an investment manager in a quid pro quo arrangement for political contributions can distort municipal investment priorities and mean that public pension plans and their beneficiaries receive sub-par advisory performance at a premium price.[3] It is one of the reasons that the Advisers Act has long prohibited such arrangements prior to the adoption of the rule.

Today, the Commission revisits Rule 206(4)-5.[4] This action is grounded in our experience in administering the rule, the burdens it has imposed, and the unintended consequences that have arisen, particularly with respect to protected political speech. The Commission’s regulations must reflect both sound policy and constitutional principles. 

However, Rule 206(4)-5’s prescriptive framework—including an automatic two-year ban triggered by even small political contributions—swept far beyond its intended target. Advisers and their employees were deterred from participating in the political process, not because of any corrupt intent, but due to the complexity and uncertainty of compliance with the rule. 

Many investment advisers found it easier to simply prohibit all political contributions by their employees, thereby chilling speech and conduct otherwise protected by the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, campaign contributions are a form of political expression, and restrictions to prevent quid pro quo corruption or its appearance must be narrowly tailored.[5] Blanket bans can undermine the very constitutional rights the rule was meant to respect.

Since its adoption, cases brought by the Commission under Rule 206(4)-5 rarely demonstrated actual quid pro quo. Instead, the rule operates as a strict liability regime, imposing potentially severe penalties for technical violations—such as minor contributions or inadvertent errors—without regard to whether any improper influence or exchange actually occurred.[6] This approach has discouraged investment managers from hiring or promoting a qualified individual solely because that person had made a past political contribution. The rule’s complexity and broad definitions have resulted in compliance burdens that are disproportionate to any demonstrated benefit or the constraints imposed on political speech. 

The Advisers Act addresses pay‑to‑play conduct through its longstanding antifraud provisions, fiduciary obligations, and compliance and ethics requirements. Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act prohibit advisers from engaging in fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative practices, and the Commission has relied on these provisions to bring pay‑to‑play enforcement actions well before Rule 206(4)-5 existed. Registered advisers must also maintain written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act, along with codes of ethics that reflect and reinforce their fiduciary duties. Together, these requirements obligate advisers to maintain compliance programs that address unlawful quid pro quo arrangements without resorting to blanket prohibitions on political speech. 

Rescinding Rule 206(4)-5 will remove an unduly complicated compliance obligation while reaffirming our commitment to constitutional protections. The existing framework under the Advisers Act can deter and sanction genuine pay-to-play misconduct, while allowing advisers and their employees to exercise their rights to political expression and association. I encourage commenters to provide feedback on this proposal and to suggest ways the Commission can further strengthen its principles-based approach to preventing corruption, without infringing on protected speech.