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Remarks At Ohio State Law Journal Symposium 2024, Gurbir S. Grewal, SEC Director, Division Of Enforcement, Washington D.C., Feb. 23, 2024

Date 23/02/2024

Good afternoon, everyone.

Dean Rose, thank you for the kind introduction.

And thank you to the Ohio State Law Journal for the invitation to share brief remarks and participate in this afternoon’s fireside chat.

As is customary, my remarks today are in my official capacity as Director of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Enforcement, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Commissioners, or other members of the staff.

***

It is also important for me to note at the outset that the Commission is not an environmental regulator. Its three-part mission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. This work requires us to use all the tools at our disposal to stand up for the investing public. And a central theme in our efforts – and a recurring theme in many of my public remarks -- has been restoring public trust in our institutions and financial markets, which has been on the decline.[1]

I have discussed elsewhere at length what we in the Division of Enforcement are doing to reverse this trend, and why it is so important to do so.[2] But briefly, we are doing this by holding bad actors accountable no matter who they are, or how well-resourced they are – to dispel that notion held by some that there may be two sets of rules: one for the big and powerful and another for everyone else. 

That is why over the last several fiscal years, we have brought more enforcement actions than in the prior years.[3] And that is why over the same period, nearly two-thirds of our actions have included charges against individuals, including corporate executives.[4]

And it’s also why our enforcement actions over the same period have included penalties and remedies that actually deter misconduct and hold bad actors accountable – to ensure that they are viewed as more than just the cost of doing business.[5]

And on this score, in fiscal year 2022, the total money ordered – penalties, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest – in Commission actions was over $6.4 billion, the highest amount in Commission history.[6] Last fiscal year, it was nearly $5 billion – the second highest amount in Commission history.[7]

And when it comes to other remedies, recent Commission actions have also included more bars keeping bad actors out of the industry,[8] as well as more cases involving admissions,[9] than in prior years – all powerful tools to further protect the public, enhance accountability and restore trust.

But promoting trust is not about enforcement alone. It can’t be. It also requires working with market participants to promote a culture of proactive compliance. So that instead of reading about compliance failures, the public understands that companies and investment firms are proactively doing what they can to be compliant.[10]

We are doing this by crediting parties that self-report their potential securities law violations and proactively cooperate with our investigations. Such parties may face substantially reduced civil penalties or even no penalties at all.[11]

We are also promoting a culture of proactive compliance by including pathways to compliance in our public orders — that is, examples of real, concrete steps that market participants can take to help ensure that they comply with the federal securities laws.[12]

One of the things that speaks powerfully to trust in the securities industry is ESG – the umbrella term for environmental, social, and governance issues – and that is because ESG speaks to what investors care about in terms of how they make money; in short, it speaks to their values.

But just as we are not an environmental regulator, we are also not the values police. We are merit neutral.[13] We are not here, for example, to judge whether a company’s operations contribute to climate change or are otherwise harmful, or beneficial, to the environment. Nor are we here to make judgments about companies based on their environmental impact. We are here to protect investors, and if they care, then we care. And in that case, we have a duty to ensure that companies speak truthfully on these topics.

And studies show that investors do care. By significant margins, they want companies to incorporate ESG considerations into their corporate strategy, even if doing so reduces short-term profitability.[14] This reflects the long-view that many investors are taking when thinking about how ESG fits into their investment approaches.

It is therefore not surprising that we have seen an explosion in public companies disclosing ESG-related information to investors. In fact, nearly all of the largest public companies in America now publish ESG reports.[15] We have likewise seen tremendous growth in investment firms offering ESG-branded products and strategies over the last several years.[16]

As these trends continue, two things can happen that may implicate the federal securities laws. First, companies have more incentives to exaggerate or make misleading statements about their perceived positive ESG activities or products. For example, public companies may disclose that their operations satisfy certain ESG-criteria or investment firms may market investment strategies as ESG-focused, when that’s not the case. 

Second, the investor focus on these issues may make it more tempting for companies to downplay or omit disclosures about negative ESG-related information. For example, they may make misleading statements about these events, or may omit them from their disclosures altogether, making the disclosures materially misleading.

So how do we analyze such misstatements or omissions in the ESG space?

The same as we do everywhere else.

We apply long-standing principles to evaluate whether disclosures or statements are materially false or misleading under the general anti-fraud and other provisions of the federal securities laws.[17]

For example, the SEC recently charged Vale, a publicly traded Brazilian mining company, with making false and misleading claims about the safety of one of its dams which collapsed in 2019, killing 270 people in one of the worst mining disasters in history.[18]

The SEC’s complaint alleged that, before the collapse, Vale regularly represented in SEC filings and in sustainability reports and ESG webinars that the dam was safe and stable. But as alleged in our complaint, the company concealed signs that the dam was not stable and manipulated dam safety audits that it touted to investors.

The complaint further alleged that Vale’s concealment of the true condition of the dam caused its sustainability reports, filings, and other ESG disclosures to be materially false and misleading.[19] Vale agreed to pay over $55 million to settle the SEC’s charges.[20]

Corporate governance is of course another important aspect of ESG. And this is another area where we have seen companies downplay or fail to disclose material information to investors that may draw unflattering attention.

Let me give you an example. Last year, the SEC charged McDonald’s after it fired its CEO for exercising poor judgment and having an inappropriate personal relationship with a McDonald’s employee in violation of corporate policy.[21] McDonald’s disclosed to investors that it had terminated the CEO “without cause” and described the terms of his separation agreement, which included his right to tens of millions of dollars in stock-based compensation. But here’s what McDonald’s did not disclose. It did not tell investors that it had exercised discretion in terminating the CEO “without cause,” and that its exercise of discretion is what allowed him to retain stock-based compensation that would have otherwise been forfeited if the company had terminated him “for cause,” which it had the ability to do under the circumstances.

That’s an example of what I mentioned earlier. Where you see how pressure to downplay ESG issues works. If you’re running a public company, it’s a lot easier to let investors think that you were contractually obligated to pay the CEO a lot of money than it is to own up to the fact that you decided to pay the executive who had an inappropriate personal relationship with a co-worker a lot of money on the way out the door. 

Investors obviously care about the difference between those two things.

These examples involved public company disclosures about their own operations. As I mentioned, investor interest in ESG has also led to significant growth in investment advisers offering ESG-branded investment products. This can also lead to situations where a firm’s desire to capitalize on investor interest in ESG exceeds its actual creation and maintenance of an ESG product.

After all, saying you have an ESG-investment strategy is pretty easy; creating one and sticking to it is another matter.

Let me give you an example. The SEC recently charged a Deutsche Bank subsidiary with making materially misleading statements about its ESG products.[22] According to the SEC’s order, the firm marketed itself as a leader in ESG that adhered to specific policies for integrating ESG considerations into its investments – it even advertised that ESG was in its “DNA.” But as it turned out, the firm did not ensure that its investment professionals actually followed all aspects of the ESG investment processes that it marketed. The firm paid a $19 million civil penalty to settle those claims.

Here’s the simple takeaway from the examples I’ve shared and from our work in this space: ESG issues are increasingly material to investors. It is therefore crucial that when companies speak about the host of issues that may fall under the rubric of ESG – whether climate, social, corporate governance or others – they do so in a way that’s not materially false or misleading.

This has obviously been just a brief foray into a very significant topic. I want to once again thank the Ohio State Law Journal for not just the invitation, but also for hosting this important conversation. Dean Rose and I will touch on some additional topics and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

 

[1] See, e.g., “Americans’ Confidence in Major U.S. Institutions Dips” (July 14, 2021), available at https://news.gallup.com/poll/352316/americans-confidence-major-institutions-dips.aspx (finding that, in 2021, 33% of respondents have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in banks; 29% in technology companies; and 18% in big business).

[2] See, e.g., Gurbir S. Grewal, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Securities Enforcement Forum (Nov. 15, 2022), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/grewal-speech-securities-enforcement-forum-111522; Gurbir S. Grewal, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Enforcement Forum West 2022 (May 12, 2022), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/grewal-remarks-securities-enforcement-forum-west-051222; Gurbir S. Grewal, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at SEC Speaks 2021 (Oct. 13, 2021), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/grewal-sec-speaks-101321.

[3] See Press Release, SEC, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2023” (Nov. 14, 2023) (“The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that it filed 784 total enforcement actions in fiscal year 2023, a 3 percent increase over fiscal year 2022, including 501 original, or “stand-alone,” enforcement actions, an 8 percent increase over the prior fiscal year.”), available at www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-234; Press Release, SEC, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY22” (Nov. 15, 2022) (“The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced that it filed 760 total enforcement actions in fiscal year 2022, a 9 percent increase over the prior year. These included 462 new, or "stand alone," enforcement actions, a 6.5 percent increase over fiscal year 2021.”), available at www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-206.

[4] See Press Release, SEC, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2023” (Nov. 14, 2023) (“In fiscal year 2023, approximately two-thirds of the SEC’s cases involved charges against one or more individuals”), available at  www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-234; Press Release, SEC, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY22” (Nov. 15, 2022), available at www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-206; see also In the Matter of Stephen J. Easterbrook and McDonald’s Corporation, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21269 (Jan 9, 2023) (settled order) (charging former McDonald’s CEO), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/33-11144.pdf; In the Matter of Dennis A. Muilenburg, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21141 (Sept. 22, 2022) (settled order) (charging former Boeing CEO), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2022/33-11106.pdf; SEC v. Carrie L. Tolstedt¸ Case No. 20-cv-07987 (N.D.Cal., Compl. filed Nov. 13, 2020) (charging former Wells Fargo Senior Executive Vice President), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2023/comp-pr2023-99.pdf.

[5] See, e.g., Gurbir S. Grewal, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Securities Enforcement Forum (Nov. 15, 2022) (“With respect to penalties and remedies, simply put, they must be adequate to both punish and deter wrongdoing. If market participants think that getting fined by the SEC is just another expense to be priced into the cost of doing business, then penalties are neither effective punishment, nor deterrence. Market participants must realize that complying with securities laws is cheaper than violating those laws.”), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/grewal-speech-securities-enforcement-forum-111522.

[6] See Press Release, SEC, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY22” (Nov. 15, 2022) (“Money ordered in SEC actions, comprising civil penalties, disgorgement, and pre-judgment interest, totaled $6.439 billion, the most on record in SEC history and up from $3.852 billion in fiscal year 2021.”), available at www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2022-206.

[7] See Press Release, SEC, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2023” (Nov. 14, 2023) (“In fiscal year 2023, the SEC obtained orders for $4.949 billion in financial remedies, the second highest amount in SEC history, after the record-setting financial remedies ordered in fiscal year 2022.”), available at www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-234.

[8] See Press Release, SEC, “SEC Announces Enforcement Results for Fiscal Year 2023” (Nov. 14, 2023) (“to protect investors from future violations, the SEC obtained 133 orders barring individuals from serving as officers and directors of public companies, the highest number in a decade”), available at www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-234; see also In the Matter of Stanley Stefanski, CPA, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21745 (Sept. 28, 2023) (settled order) (former Pareteum controller barred from serving as officer or director and denied privilege of appearing or practicing before Commission as accountant), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/33-11245.pdf; Press Release, SEC, “Former Wells Fargo Senior Executive Carrie Tolstedt Agrees to Settle SEC Fraud Charges for Misleading Investors About Abusive Sales Practices to Inflate a Key Performance Metric” (May 30, 2023) (former Wells Fargo CFO barred from serving as officer or director of public company and agreed to pay a $3 million civil penalty and more than $1.9 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest as part of settlement of fraud charges for misleading investors about the success of Wells Fargo’s core business), available at www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-99, complaint available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2023/comp-pr2023-99.pdf; In the Matter of Stephen J. Easterbrook and McDonald’s Corporation, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21269 (Jan 9, 2023) (settled order) (former McDonald’s CEO barred from serving as officer or director for five years and agreed to pay $400,000 civil penalty to settle fraud charges for making false and misleading statements about circumstances leading to his termination from McDonald’s), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/33-11144.pdf.

[9] See, e.g., In the Matter of Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, et al., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21552 (Aug. 8, 2023) (settled order), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/34-98076.pdf; In the Matter of BofA Securities, Inc. and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21166 (Sept. 27, 2022) (settled order), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2022/34-95921.pdf; In the Matter of Ernst & Young LLP, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-20911 (June 28, 2022) (settled order), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2022/34-95167.pdf; In the Matter of Allianz Global Investors U.S. LLC, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-20855 (May 17, 2022) (settled order), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2022/34-94927.pdf.

[10] See, e.g., Gurbir S. Grewal, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at New York City Bar Association Compliance Institute (Oct. 23, 2023), available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/grewal-remarks-nyc-bar-association-compliance-institute-102423.

[11] See, e.g., In the Matter of Cloopen Group Holding Limited (Feb. 6, 2024), Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21844) (settled order) (resolving matter without imposing civil penalties and noting that the Commission considered respondent’s self-report and cooperation in determining to accept the offer), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2024/34-99483.pdf; see also In the Matter of GTT Communications, Inc. (Sept. 25, 2023), Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21708 (settled order), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/33-11241.pdf; In the Matter of View, Inc. (July 3, 2023), Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21505 (settled order), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/33-11208.pdf

[12] See, e.g., In the Matter of Wells Fargo Securities, LLC, et al. (Aug. 8, 2023), Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21552 (settled order) (ordering respondents to comply with various undertakings in resolution of matter involving failure to comply with recordkeeping requirements imposed by the federal securities laws), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/34-98076.pdf.

[13] See, e.g., Gensler, Gary, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony of Chair Gary Gensler before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services (April 18, 2023) (“The SEC, as designed by Rayburn and Roosevelt, is merit neutral. We don’t take a view on particular companies or investments. Thus, the SEC has no role as to climate risk itself. But we do have an important role with regard to ensuring for public companies’ full, fair, and truthful disclosure about material risks.”).

[14] See, e.g., PwC, “PwC’s Global Investor Survey 2023” (Nov. 15, 2023) (reporting that 70% of survey respondents agree that companies “should embed ESG directly into their corporate strategy” and 66% agree that companies “should make expenditures that address ESG issues relevant to their business even if it reduces short-term profitability”) available at www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/c-suite-insights/global-investor-survey.html.

[15] See, e.g., Governance and Accountability Institute, “2023 Sustainability Reporting In Focus” (reporting that 98% of S&P 500 Companies and 90% of Russell 1000 companies published ESG reports in 2022), available at www.ga-institute.com/research/ga-research-directory/sustainability-reporting-trends.html.

[16] See, e.g., PwC, “PwC’s Asset and Wealth Management Revolution 2022 report” (Oct. 10, 2022) (“Under PwC’s base-case growth scenario, ESG-oriented AUM in the US (the largest AWM market) would more than double from US$4.5tn in 2021 to US$10.5 tn in 2026.”), available at  www.pwc.com/gx/en/news-room/press-releases/2022/awm-revolution-2022-report.html.

[17] See, e.g., Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

[18] SEC v. Vale S.A., Case No. 22-cv-2405 (E.D.N.Y., Compl. filed April 28, 2022), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/complaints/2022/comp-pr2022-72.pdf.

[19] Id. at ¶ 16 (“Vale’s concealment of the true condition of the Brumadinho and other tailings dams caused Vale’s sustainability reports, periodic filings, and other Environmental, Social, and Governance (‘ESG’) disclosures to be materially false and misleading. Vale’s deceit misled investors regarding several material issues: the stability of Vale’s dams; the nature of Vale’s safety practices in the wake of the Mariana dam disaster; and the actual risk of catastrophic financial consequences should any of its high-risk dams, like the Brumadinho dam, collapse.”).

[20] See Press Release, SEC, “Brazilian Mining Company to Pay $55.9 Million to Settle Charges Related to Misleading Disclosures Prior to Deadly Dam Collapse” (March 28, 2023), available at www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2023-63.

[21] See In the Matter of Stephen J. Easterbrook and McDonald’s Corporation, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21269 (Jan 9, 2023) (settled order), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/33-11144.pdf.

[22] See In the Matter of DWS Investment Management Americas, Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-21709 (Sept. 25, 2023) (settled order), available at www.sec.gov/files/litigation/admin/2023/ia-6432.pdf.