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The final rules before us today codify and interpret the core principles that apply to designated contract markets, or “DCMs.” As with so many of our rules, today’s recommendations are designed to protect the public and ensure fair competition between exchanges and markets.
The recommendations seek to accomplish this objective in multiple ways. They require, for example, risk controls and safeguards for trading on regulated exchanges, which better ensure that our markets remain transparent and stable. They also require that DCMs, as self-regulatory organizations, are capable of detecting and preventing position-limit violations, disruptive practices, and manipulation.
Additionally, the rules protect the efficiency of our markets both by ensuring the integrity of listed contracts and by ensuring that participants have appropriate clearing arrangements, thereby mitigating counterparty credit concerns that could impede liquidity. And the rules set forth a number of additional requirements that will enable DCMs to transition from trading venues solely for futures contracts to venues facilitating trading in swaps as well.
As we consider these rules, it is important to acknowledge that the Commodity Exchange Act’s principles-based regulatory regime was retained in Dodd-Frank. Indeed, Congress not only retained much of the previous DCM regime, but also expanded that regime to new registered entities, like swap data repositories and swap execution facilities, or SEFs.
But it is equally important to acknowledge that Dodd-Frank did not merely restate the existing regulatory responsibilities of DCMs. It expanded those responsibilities by authorizing DCMs to facilitate trading in swaps, and to facilitate such trading between retail market participants. These swap-related functions and responsibilities, and the evolution of the futures markets over the past decade, informed Congress’s decision to add several new core principles to the DCM regime, as well as provide the Commission the authority to specify the means of compliance.
It is important, however, that the Commission use this authority cautiously and avoid unnecessarily upsetting the expectations of those who depend on the exchanges. To be sure, private incentives are not always aligned with the public interest; but in seeking to align those incentives, we must take care to avoid doing harm to what is now a functional and effective marketplace.
In light of these considerations, the swap-market structure poses difficult policy questions for the Commission and equally difficult operational questions for DCMs. The rules before us today will not answer all of these questions.
Perhaps most consequentially, the Commission today is not considering Core Principle 9 so that it can fully evaluate it in the context of the swap-execution rules. Many DCMs and potential SEFs no doubt would like regulatory certainty. But I am confident that the public will be best served by a continued dialogue on Core Principle 9 and related issues. Public input remains our best protection against unintended consequences.
The debate about Core Principle 9 is not and should not be about a particular trading venue or business model, nor is it about the value of trading through the centralized market. Centralized trading enhances the transparency and efficiency of markets; and centralized trading generally means increased pre-trade transparency, and more specifically order book transparency, which provides important information about the supply of, and demand for, a particular commodity or contract. In short, centralized trading facilitates price discovery, provided there is sufficient trading interest to discover.
I believe there is consensus on the objectives of increasing centralized trading and pre-trade transparency. There remain, however, many challenging questions about the best means for achieving these objectives. For instance, there can be tension between our centralized-trading objective and our statutory objectives of reducing systemic risk and promoting responsible innovation at exchanges. I look forward to engaging with the public on these questions in the months ahead.
For now, I am confident that these final rules appropriately carry out the relatively modest changes to the core-principles regime for DCMs.
Exemptive Order
I also will be supporting the proposal to further extend our current exemptive relief under the Commodity Exchange Act as we continue to implement Dodd-Frank. The exemptive relief would apply only to statutory provisions for which no rulemaking is required. An extension is appropriate in order to provide legal certainty and assure that market practices will not be unduly disrupted during the transition. I welcome input from the public on both the proposed sunset date and the proposed treatment of ag swaps.
Thank you again to the professional staff for your hard work on the rules and orders before the Commission today. I will address a few additional issues in my questions to the staff.
