Main Prize
Söhnke Bartram and Frank Fehle observe the successful co-existence of two option markets, namely Eurex and Stuttgart-based Euwax, despite the fact that these two markets offer many options with identical or very similar characteristics. They analyse this situation and find that the investor clienteles of the two markets differ significantly with respect to their inclination to selling the option before maturity. From this, the authors conclude that option market structure does matter when trying to address different circles of customers. The authors conclude that the creation of markets for options issued by banks (i.e. warrants as these are securitised options) in the US could serve the speculator/informed investor clientele there while at the same time creating healthy competitive pressure on existing markets such as the CBOE. Finally, they hint at the successful regulatory framework for warrants in Germany as a possible example for application in the wider EU context.
Honorarable mention was made to Carole Gresse for the paper "Crossing Network Trading and the Liquidity of a Dealer Market: Cream-Skimming or Risk Sharing?" (see abstract)
Special Prize
The Josseph de la Vega Special Prize for a paper on Emerging Markets issues went to Alexandra Gregoric and Christina Vespro for their paper: "Block Trades and The Benefits from Control in Slovenia".
Alexandra Gregoric and Christina Vespro analyse the particularities of ownership and control structure of listed companies in Slovenia. Contrary to the situation in most of the other Central and Eastern European countries, Slovenian listed companies tend not to have on single majority shareholder; partially as a consequence of former co-operative ownership structures, their largest shareholders tend to control only about 30% of the capital. Large stakes are in the hand of "inside owners", i.e. current and former employees and their family members. Concentration of ownership, however, is growing. Control in companies is evidently seen as valuable and large shareholders expect to gain some "private benefits" from increasing their control power. Against this, the authors see an increasing challenge for the corporate governance regime in the country in protecting minority investors.
Josseph de la Vega Prize 2003 - Jury
Jury Chairman:
Prof. Sven Caspersen, Rector of Aalborg University (Denmark), former President of FESE
Jury Members:
Mr. Lars Bredin, former President and CEO of Stockholmsbörsen (Sweden)
Prof. Jean Dermine, Professor of Banking & Finance of INSEAD
Prof. Karel Lannoo, Chief Executive, Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels (Belgium)
Dr. Ahmad Rahnema, Professor of the IESE, University of Navarra (Spain)
Mr. Jeffrey Ruzicka, Senior Vice President, State Street Bank and Trust Co. (U.K.)
Mr. Stephan Seip, Director General BVI Bundesverband Deutscher Investment
Prof. Dr. Hartmut Schmidt, Professor of Finance, University of Hamburg (Germany)
Prof. Paulo Soares de Pinho, Universidade Nova Economia e Gestao, Lisbon (Portugal)
Prof. M. F. Theobald, Professor of Finance and Investment, University of Birmingham (U.K.)
Mr. Paul Arlman, Secretary General FESE (non-voting)
